State of Utah v. Louis A. Amorososo and Beer Across America, an Illinois Corporation: Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
State of Utah v. Louis A. Amorososo and Beer
Across America, an Illinois Corporation: Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Wayne Klein; Assistant Attorneys General; Carol Clawson; Utah Solicitor
General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Counsel for Appellant.
David B. Thompson; Tesch, Thompson & Vance LLC; Morton Siegel; Siegel, Moses, Schoenstadt &
Webster, PC; Counsel for Appelles.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Amoroso, No. 970712 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1239
0 IM '^ 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
IN THE UTAH COURT 0© APPEALS 
DOCKET NO. 
,r**£ALS 
1EF 
77<?7g O? 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, Case No. 970712-CA 
v. 
LOUIS A. AMOROSO and BEER 
ACROSS AMERICA, an Illinois 
Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
* Priority No. 15 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
State's Appeal from the Orders of Dismissal of the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
WAYNE KLEIN (3819) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
CAROL CLAWSON (4813) 
Utah Solicitor General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Counsel for Appellant 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
TESCH, THOMPSON & 
VANCE, LLC 
314 Main Street, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060-3390 
Telephone: (435) 649-0077 
MORTON SIEGEL 
SIEGEL MOSES SCHOENSTADT & 
WEBSTER, P.C. 
I l l East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 
Chicago, Illinois 60601-4801 
Counsel for Appellees 
AUG 2 8 1398 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, * Case No. 970712-CA 
LOUIS A. AMOROSO and BEER 
ACROSS AMERICA, an Illinois 
Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
* Priority No. 15 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
State's Appeal from the Orders of Dismissal of the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
WAYNE KLEIN (3819) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
CAROL CLAWSON (4813) 
Utah Solicitor General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
TESCH, THOMPSON & 
VANCE, LLC 
314 Main Street, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060-3390 
Telephone: (435) 649-0077 
MORTON SIEGEL 
SIEGEL MOSES SCHOENSTADT & 
WEBSTER, P.C. 
I l l East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 
Chicago, Illinois 60601-4801 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 7 
A. State's situs-of-sale argument 8 
B. State's argument that charges were not limited to a "sale" 10 
C. State's argument that the magistrate relied on the wrong 
statutory definition of "sale" 12 
D. State's plain-error argument concerning jurisdiction 12 
E. Summary 15 
ARGUMENT 
A. The magistrate correctly concluded that the state's prosecution 
violated the Commerce Clause and was not within the authority 
granted by the Twenty-first Amendment 15 
B. The magistrate correctly concluded that Utah lacks jurisdiction 
to enforce its alcoholic-beverage-control laws against BAA 
for conduct occurring outside the state 36 
CONCLUSION 48 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
United States Supreme Court Cases 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. V. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) 19 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority 
476 U.S. 573 (1986) 21, 22, 23, 29 
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, 
445 U.S. 97 (1980) 18, 19 
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) 29 
Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) 23 
Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) 19, 20 
324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) 30 
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) 18 
State Cases 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990) 4, 34 
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995) 42 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996) 33 
Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1996) 1 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) 10 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993) 10, 11, 39, 46 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 12, 13 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) 10 
State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah App. 1993) 35 
ii 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 
26 
State v. McGrath, 928 P.2d 1033 (Utah App. 1996) 38 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2, 35 
State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 (Utah App. 1994) 11 
State v. Sam's Wines & Liquors, No. 963602 (Sept. 3, 1997), 
appeal pending, No. 97-03828 (Fla. 1st DCA) 32 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 35 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const, amend. XVIII, § 1 (1919, repealed 1933) 17 
U.S. Const, amend. XXI, § 2 18 
U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3 19 
Statutes 
810 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-106(1) (1993) 25 
810 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-401(2)(a) (1993) 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-102(30 (1994) 24, 41 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(47) (1994) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-9-101(2) (1994) 39, 41 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-201 (1994) 42 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-212 (1994) 46, 47 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-503 (1994) 43, 47 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-106(l) (1997) 9, 24 
iii 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-401(2)(a) (1997) 24 
Utah Code Arm. § 70A-2-401(2)(b) (1997) 9, 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (Supp. 1998) 37, 40, 41 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1995) 47 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601 et seq. (1995) 46 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1998) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) 1 
Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 4, 33 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 5, 34 
Utah R. Crim. P. 25 5, 34 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
David James Homsey, Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: 
The Application of a Minimum Contacts Theory, 
17 San Diego L. Rev. 429 (1980) 36 
Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 16.2(a) (1984) . . . 14 
Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., 1 Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 1.2(c) (1986) 40 
Note, Liquor Price affirmation Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
86 Mich. L. Rev. 186 (1987) 19 
Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control Over 
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 
79 Cal. L. Rev. 161 (1991) 17, 18 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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V. * 
LOUIS A. AMOROSO and BEER * Priority No. 15 
ACROSS AMERICA, an Illinois 
Corporation, * 
Defendants/Appellees. * 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
\ 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-
l(2)(a) (Supp. 1998) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the magistrate correctly dismiss the charges against defendants on the 
alternative grounds that the charges violated the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution and that the court lacked jurisdiction. 
The magistrate's decision presents questions of law that this Court reviews de 
novo. See Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah App. 1996) 
(reviewing for correctness trial court's order dismissing criminal information). The 
findings of fact underlying the magistrate's legal conclusions are reviewed for clear 
error. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (a trial court's "[f]indings of 
fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly erroneous standard"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of the issue presented on appeal involves die interpretation of the 
following provisions, which are reproduced in Addendum A of the State's brief: 
U.S. CONST, amend. XXI, § 2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-1-105 (1994) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-9-101 (1994) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-201 (1994) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-503 (1994) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-106(l) (1997) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-401 (1997) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (Supp. 1998) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Louis A. Amoroso and Beer Across America (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "BAA") in separate five-count informations with the 
following offenses: 
Count I Unlawful importation of alcoholic product, a class B misdemeanor, 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-503 (1994); 
Count II Unlawful sale or supply of alcoholic beverage or product, a class B 
misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-201 (1994); 
Count III Unlawful warehousing, distribution, and transportation of liquor, a 
class B misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-9-101(2) 
(1994); 
Count IV Unlawful sale or supply of alcoholic beverage to minors, a class A 
misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-203 (Supp. 1996); 
and 
2 
Count V Pattern of unlawful activity, a second-degree felony, under UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1601 and -1603.5 et seq. (1995). 
(R. 70:282-87; 71:297-302; Appellant's Br., Addendum C).1 
BAA moved to dismiss the charges on various grounds. (R. 70:60-82, 96-175; 
R. 71:98-209). The magistrate dismissed counts 1, 11, 111, and V, concluding that the 
court lacked jurisdiction over BAA and that the charges violated the Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 3). Orders on 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (hereafter "Orders") (Appellant's Br., Addendum B). 
The State appeals trom the magistrate's order of dismissal.2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In dismissing the charges against BAA, the magistrate found the following 
undisputed facts: 
1. Beer Across America, Inc. ("BAA") is an Illinois corporation. 
Louis A. Amoroso is its president and a shareholder. 
2. BAA markets several products, including beer ("heavy" beer, 
which qualifies as "liquor" for purposes of the applicable Utah laws), by 
1
 As the State notes, the parallel proceedings for the two defendants resulted in 
separate records, separately paginated. Citations to the separate records in this brief 
will be in the same form used by the State in its brief: "R. 70: " refers to a page in 
the record for State v. Amoroso, Dist. Ct. No. 971002970, and "R. 7 1 : _ " refers to a 
page in the record for State v. Beer Across America, Dist. Ct. No. 971002971. The 
single transcript of the hearing on BAA's motions to dismiss will be cited in the usual 
manner: "R. ." 
2
 As the State notes, it voluntarily dismissed Count IV without prejudice. (R. 
70:702-04; R. 71:628-30). 
3 
advertising nationally, including in Utah, by Internet, newsletters, and 
word-of-mouth. 
3. Customers purchase BAA products by means of mail, telephone 
800 number, and perhaps some Internet orders, all initiated by the 
purchaser. 
4. BAA's sole business location is in Illinois. BAA has no 
property in Utah, neither does it have any representatives in this state. 
BAA does not engage in any direct solicitation of Utah customers within 
this state, and during the period covered by the Information (April 
through December, 1996), BAA sent no employees, representatives or 
agents into this state. 
5. All purchases, whether from Utah customers or from other 
locations, require prepayment (by credit card, check, or deposit to a club 
account, against which account purchases are charged) of merchandise, 
full freight charges, and handling, before any purchases are delivered to 
the shipper. 
6. All purchases are delivered to a shipper in Illinois, freight paid, 
for delivery to the customer in accordance with the customer's 
instructions. 
7. BAA collects and pays sales tax on all purchases in Illinois, to 
Illinois taxation authorities. 
Orders 3-4 (Appellant's Br., Addendum B).3 
3
 The State does not challenge the magistrate's findings of undisputed fact, 
choosing instead to set forth its own statement of facts drawn from the probable cause 
affidavits attached to the State's informations. Appellant's Br. 5-6. Citing a civil case, 
the State takes the position that, in reviewing the magistrate's order of dismissal, this 
Court must presume as true the facts alleged in those affidavits (which are identical for 
each information), because "'[a] motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly 
appears that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under 
any set of facts they could prove to support their claim."' Appellant's Br. 16 (quoting 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (emphasis supplied by 
State)). As hereafter discussed, that civil standard for motions to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not apply in this criminal case. 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate correctly dismissed the charges against BAA on the ground that 
they violated the Commerce Clause. The State's attempt in this case to regulate BAA's 
sale of alcoholic beverages in Illinois is, under a long line of United States Supreme 
Court decisions, prohibited by the Commerce Clause and beyond a state's authority 
under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate alcohol within its borders. Based on his 
findings that BAA's sales of beer to Utah buyers were completed in Illinois and that the 
buyers were responsible for the shipment of the beei into Utah, the magistrate correctly 
concluded that the State could not project its liquor laws beyond its borders to regulate 
BAA's commercial activity in Illinois. 
The State's attacks on the magistrate's Commerce Clause/Twenty-first 
Amendment ruling are either (1) unpreserved or (2) based on an incorrect assumption 
that the magistrate was required to accept as fact the State's assertion that BAA's sales 
of beer to Utah customers occurred in Utah, not in Illinois, and on a misapplication of 
the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence. 
Contrary to the State's view, under Rules 12 and 2t> ot the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the magistrate was free to make findings of fact necessary to the 
resolution of BAA's motions to dismiss. The magistrate therefore was not required to 
presume that BAA's sales of beer to Utah customers occurred in Utah, as the State 
5 
contends. Rather, he properly resolved the factual question concerning where BAA's 
sales of beer occurred (i.e., in Illinois or in Utah) and entered appropriate findings. 
Further, the magistrate properly considered the location of the sales to be a 
critical threshold question for purposes of deciding the legal issue concerning the 
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment. Having found that all of the sales 
occurred entirely in Illinois, the magistrate correctly concluded that under the 
applicable Supreme Court case law, the State's prosecution of BAA amounted to an 
attempt to regulate commercial activity in another state in violation of the Commerce 
Clause. 
Because the State's prosecution is barred by the Commerce Clause, this Court 
need not go on to consider the State's challenge to the magistrate's additional ground 
for dismissal - lack of jurisdiction. But, in the event the Court finds it necessary to 
address the magistrate's ruling on jurisdiction, the State has failed to demonstrate that 
he erred in dismissing the charges for lack of jurisdiction. 
Under Utah's criminal jurisdiction statute, the provision the State contends 
governs this case, Utah does not have jurisdiction to prosecute BAA for conduct that 
occurred entirely in Illinois. The State argues that BAA's conduct in Illinois produced 
unlawful results in Utah and thus the "result" test contained in the criminal jurisdiction 
statute is satisfied. This Court should reject that argument for two reasons. First, the 
argument was not sufficiently developed below to preserve the issue for review. 
6 
Second, the criminal jurisdiction statute requires that the "result" upon which the State 
bases its prosecution be an element of the offense charged. None of the "results" 
identified by the State are elements of the charged offenses. In short, the magistrate 
correctly concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction under the criminal jurisdiction 
statute. 
Accordingly, the magistrate's order of dismissal should be affirmed. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
It is important at the outset to clarify what issues and arguments are properly 
before this Court, as there are a number of arguments the State presents on appeal that 
were not made below. 
The magistrate refused to exercise jurisdiction in this case and dismissed the 
charges on two grounds: (1) Utah lacked jurisdiction over BAA under both civil 
jurisdiction criteria and criminal jurisdiction criteria, and (2) Utah's attempt to enforce 
its alcoholic-beverage-control statutes to regulate conduct occurring entirely outside 
Utah violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and was not 
within the state's authority to regulate liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment The 
magistrate concluded that a critical threshold question for both the jurisdictional issue 
and the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment issue was the situs of BAA's sale 
of beer to a Utah purchaser - that is, where did title to the beer sold by BAA pass from 
BAA to the Utah purchaser, in Illinois or in Utah? He ultimately found that title passed 
7 
in Illinois, that the sale therefore was completed in Illinois, and that Utah could not 
prosecute BAA for conduct that occurred wholly outside its borders. 
On appeal, the State attacks every aspect of the magistrate's decision, but, as 
explained below, a number of its arguments were not preserved and consequently are 
not properly before this Court. 
A. State's situs-of-sale argument 
The State contends that "the locus of the sale is not 'a critical threshold issue,' as 
the magistrate supposed." Appellant's Br. 12. That argument, however, was not made 
below. The State never argued to the magistrate that he need not decide where the sale 
occurred in order to resolve the larger issues concerning jurisdiction and the Commerce 
Clause. Rather, the State, along with BAA, framed the issues in such a way that situs 
of the transaction between BAA and a Utah purchaser was a critical threshold question. 
As discussed more fully below, the State made it clear to the magistrate that the 
charges were based on the theory that BAA had shipped beer into Utah in violation of 
Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. In short, the alleged illegal shipment of 
alcoholic beverages into the state was the targeted activity. That the State considered 
situs of sale to be a critical threshold question in determining whether BAA was subject 
to prosecution in Utah under the illegal-shipment theory is plain from the way the State 
argued the case to the magistrate. 
For example, in responding to BAA's argument that the sales of beer to Utah 
buyers all occurred in Illinois, that shipment of the beer from Illinois to Utah was paid 
8 
for and directed by the buyers, and that therefore Utah's attempt to prosecute BAA for 
lawful sales of beer in Illinois violated the Commerce Clause, the State wrote: 
Only after creating the fiction that Utah residents actually make and 
consummate their purchase in Illinois, and that it is the purchasers who 
arrange for delivery in Utah, do defendants argue that Utah's laws force 
them to change their operations in Illinois. 
Pltf.'s Mem. 16 (R. 71:352). The State then argued that under a Utah tax code 
provision, the sale took place in Utah, not in Illinois, thus making "all of defendants' 
arguments about the transaction taking place in Illinois * * * beside the point." Ibid. 
In oral argument, when asked by the magistrate to address the issue of where 
title to the beer passed from BAA to the Utah buyer, the prosecutor - never once 
hinting that the passage-of-title issue was irrelevant - cited section 70A-2-401(2)(b) of 
the Utah Code (a UCC provision) and argued that title to the beer did not pass from 
BAA to the buyer until delivery of the beer in Utah.4 That fact, the prosecutor 
contended, supported the State's theory that BAA held title to the beer when it crossed 
the border into Utah, and thus BAA had shipped alcoholic beverages into the state in 
violation of Utah law. (R. 754-56). 
4
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-401(2)(b) (1997) provides that "if the contract 
requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender there." Under the UCC as 
adopted in Utah, "sale" is defined by the passing of title. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-
106(1) (1997). 
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In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the parties considered the preliminary 
question of BAA's status with respect to the beer at the time it entered Utah with the 
shipper to be a central component of the magistrate's inquiry. The prosecutor never 
took a contrary position below. Indeed, his citation to and argument under a UCC 
provision dealing with passage of title and the definition of "sale" demonstrate that he 
held a view concerning the importance of the situs-of-sale question that is just the 
opposite of what the State now asserts on appeal. 
The State may not give the magistrate the impression that it agrees the situs-of-
sale question is central to the analysis (by making no suggestion otherwise to him) and 
then on appeal argue that the magistrate made a fundamental error in concluding that 
the question was pivotal. Accordingly, this Court should not consider that argument. 
It is well settled that an appellate court will not consider arguments raised by an 
appellant for the first time on appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
359-60 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). 
B. State's argument that charges were not limited to a "sale" 
The State asserts that because the charges were not limited to a "sale," 
"defendants' criminal liability does not hang only on a 'sale' having been 
consummated." Appellant's Br. 14. The State did not present that argument to the 
magistrate. Rather, as just discussed, it made clear to the magistrate that it was 
pursuing an illegal-shipment theory and that that theory depended on the notion that 
10 
BAA's sales of beer occurred in Utah, not in Illinois. Regarding the illegal-shipment 
theory, the prosecutor told the magistrate: 
We are not in any way attempting to tell Beer Across America they cannot 
have an [I]nternet site. We are not telling them they cannot advertise in 
magazines. We are telling them that they take orders and have those 
orders sent into the State of Utah, when the alcohol passes the state 
borders, then Utah law applies. 
* * * * 
The violation occurs when alcohol is transported across state lines. 
(R. 753, 759). The State further emphasized the point in its memorandum: "If 
defendants had not shipped alcoholic beverages into the state, there would be no crime 
in Utah." Pltf.'s Mem. 11 (R. 71:347). 
That the State's theory depended on resolution of the situs-of-sale question in its 
favor was clear from its insistence that the magistrate determine that BAA's sales 
occurred in Utah, not in Illinois. In now arguing on appeal that BAA's criminal 
liability "does not hang only on a sale having been consummated," the State is 
introducing a new theory. Its theory below clearly hung on there having been a sale 
and that the sale occurred in Utah. It is well settled that this Court will not consider 
new theories raised by an appellant for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 
Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 155 n. 3 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to consider defendant's new 
theory for first time on appeal); Brown, 856 P.2d at 361 (same). Thus, the Court 
should not consider the State's new theory that BAA's liability does not turn on the sale 
issue. 
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C. State's argument that the magistrate relied on the wrong statutory definition 
of "sale" 
The State argues for the first time on appeal that "[t]he magistrate relied on the 
wrong statutory definition of the word 'sale.'" Appellant's Br. 14. According to the 
State, the magistrate's reliance on a UCC provision for the definition of sale was 
erroneous, because "UCC definitions do not apply in criminal cases." Ibid. It 
contends the magistrate should have looked to the definition of "sale" in the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act (UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-1-105(47) (1994)). Id. at 15. 
As previously noted, when asked by the magistrate to address the situs-of-sale 
issue, the prosecutor offered only the UCC provision (§ 70A-2-401) as authority for 
deciding that issue. He never mentioned section 32A-1-105(47). Thus, any error the 
magistrate allegedly committed in relying on section 70A-2-401 rather than section 
32A-1-105(47) is attributable to the State. Indeed, if error at all, it amounts to invited 
error, which this Court will not review. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993) ("We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of 
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error. 
This rule * * * is known as the 'invited error' doctrine * * *."). 
D. State's plain-error argument concerning jurisdiction 
Finally, the State makes an argument concerning jurisdiction that was not made 
below and therefore should not be considered by this Court. In arguing that this case is 
governed by principles of criminal jurisdiction, not civil "minimum contacts" analysis, 
12 
the State contends that the magistrate should have concluded that the court had personal 
jurisdiction over BAA because BAA was present in court. Appellant's Br. 19-22 
(citing numerous cases standing for the proposition that the presence of a criminal 
defendant in court is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant). 
Implicitly acknowledging that this argument was not made below, the State seeks 
review of the question by contending that "[t]he magistrate's failure to recognize sua 
sponte his personal jurisdiction over defendants was plain error." Appellant's Br. 22 n. 
10. 
To establish plain error, the State must show "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant[.]" Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. "If any one of these requirements is not 
met, plain error is not established." Id. at 1209. The State's plain-error argument fails 
because the alleged error could not have been obvious to the magistrate. 
Significantly, in the long list of cases the State cites for the proposition that a 
criminal defendant's mere presence in court confers personal jurisdiction, there is but 
one Utah case: Washington v. Renouf, 5 Utah 2d 185, 299 P.2d 620 (1956). Only that 
decision, of all the cases cited by the State, would have been controlling authority for 
the magistrate. The question then is whether it should have been obvious to the 
13 
magistrate that Washington resolves the unique jurisdictional issue presented in this 
case.5 
In Washington, the Utah Supreme Court's narrow holding was that the trial court 
had jurisdiction over the defendant in a burglary prosecution, even though he may have 
been returned to Utah from Nevada illegally. 299 P.2d at 621. The court decided no 
other issue. It did not have before it the issue presented in the instant case: whether, 
under the specific facts of this case, Utah can apply its alcoholic-beverage-control laws 
to BAA for commercial conduct that occurred entirely outside the state. That issue is 
altogether different from the one decided in Washington. Further, there is no indication 
in Washington, or any of the other cases the State cites, that the general proposition for 
which they stand ends the analysis in a case like this one, where the issue is the 
propriety of Utah's extraterritorial application of its laws to regulate commercial 
activity that is lawfully conducted in Illinois. 
Contrary to the State's view, therefore, it could not have been obvious to the 
magistrate that he need go no further than Washington and similar decisions from other 
jurisdictions to decide the jurisdictional issue in this case. The magistrate did not 
commit plain error. 
The term "jurisdiction" is used here to mean a state's ability to prosecute a 
defendant for conduct occurring outside its borders. See Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold 
H. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 16.2(a), p. 342 (1984) (discussing the concept of 
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E. Summary 
In sum, the State advances a number of arguments that this Court should not 
consider because they were not raised below and do not fall within an exception to the 
waiver rule. In light of this Court's firm position that it will not consider arguments or 
issues presented for the first time on appeal in the absence of plain error or exceptional 
circumstances (neither of which have been established by the State), BAA will not 
address the State's unpreserved arguments beyond the foregoing discussion. If for 
some reason the Court is inclined to address the merits of any of the State's 
unpreserved arguments, BAA requests the opportunity to submit additional briefing. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The magistrate correctly concluded that the State's prosecution violated the 
Commerce Clause and was not within the authority granted by the Twenty-
first Amendment. 
1. Introduction 
Regarding the constitutional issues raised by the criminal charges against BAA, 
the magistrate ruled that "Utah's attempts to enforce its Alcohol[ic] Beverage Control 
legislation, as set forth in Counts I, II and III of the Amended Informations, is violative 
of the Commerce Clause and not within the authority granted by the Twenty-first 
Amendment." Orders 9 (Appellant's Br., Addendum B). Finding that "[BAA]'s sales 
take place entirely outside Utah," the magistrate concluded that "Utah may not extend 
jurisdiction and noting that the term carries a number of meanings, including the one 
referred to here). 
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its authority to regulate * * * activity that occurs entirely outside its borders." Ibid. 
On appeal, the State attacks the magistrate's Commerce Clause ruling by arguing 
that he erroneously "ignor[ed] the constitutional concepts of transportation, 
importation, delivery, and use, choosing instead to focus solely on sales, a concept that 
is not mentioned in the Twenty-first Amendment and plays no part in the Supreme 
Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence." Appellant's Br. 36 (citation to record 
omitted). The State argues that the magistrate should not have considered the question 
of where the "sale" of the beer occurred; rather, he should have focused solely on 
BAA's alleged "'transportation or importation into' Utah 'for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors'" and the State's effort to regulate that activity. Ibid. According to 
the State, the magistrate's "conclusion that this prosecution is unconstitutional was, 
consequently, erroneous." Ibid. For the following reasons, the State's argument fails. 
2. Prohibition, its repeal, and the interplay between the Commerce 
Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment 
At the outset, a brief history of Prohibition, its repeal by the Twenty-first 
Amendment, and the interplay between that amendment and the Commerce Clause will 
be helpful. 
a. Prohibition 
"Despite this country's Puritan beginnings, Americans have always consumed 
liquor. The Puritan spirit, however, contributed to transforming this country in the 
1800s from a society of intemperance to a society of sobriety." Sidney J. Spaeth, The 
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Twenty-First Amendment and State Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating 
the Federal Interest, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 161, 164 (1991). "During the 1800s, liquor was 
regulated at the local and state level. The federal government was passive, and when it 
did stir, it acted primarily through a Congress eager to appease the states and to provide 
more statutory authority for state control." Id. at 165. In the last part of the 1800s and 
at the turn of the century, however, a movement toward greater federal control of 
liquor began with the emergence of a growing and aggressive force of prohibitionists. 
"[A]cross the country, the temperance banner was carried by the formidable Anti-
Saloon League (ASL), a federation of churches and temperance societies that evolved 
into one of the most powerful political organizations in United States history." Id. at 
170. 
For the first 17 years of the 1900s, liquor regulation remained primarily in the 
hands of the states, with some assisting legislation from Congress. By 1917, 24 states 
had prohibition laws. Id. at 175 & n. 92. That set the stage for national prohibition, as 
the United States entered World War I. "The escalating anti-drink fervor combined 
with wartime regulation to accelerate federal control of intoxicating liquor," id. at 175, 
and in January of 1919, the states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited 
the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation 
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes." U.S. CONST, amend. XVIII, § 1 
(1919, repealed 1933). Thus began Prohibition. 
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b. Repeal of Prohibition 
Federal efforts to regulate alcoholic beverages during Prohibition, however, 
failed miserably. Spaeth, supra, at 174-80. That dismal experience and the onset of 
the Great Depression swung the country's sentiment decisively in favor of the repeal of 
the Eighteenth Amendment and a return of alcoholic-beverage control to the states. Id. 
at 179-80. With the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933, the Eighteenth 
Amendment was repealed. The Twenty-first Amendment provides in part: 
The transportation or importation into any state, territory, or 
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. 
U.S. CONST, amend. XXI, § 2. 
The Twenty-first Amendment gave each state the freedom to adopt whatever 
regulatory scheme it desired for the control of alcoholic beverages within its borders. 
See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 110 
(1980) ("The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over 
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor 
distribution system."); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 299 
(1945) (the Twenty-first Amendment grants a state "full authority to determine the 
conditions upon which liquor can come into its territory and what will be done with it 
after it gets there"). Utah became one of eighteen "control states," "where the state 
contracts directly with the producers[,] * * * thus resulting] in state control of virtually 
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all aspects of the liquor industry." Note, Liquor Price Affirmation Statutes and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 186, 188 & n. 23 (1987). 
c. The Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment 
Although there has been some disagreement concerning to what degree the 
Twenty-first Amendment returned authority over liquor control to the states, see 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984) (discussing obscurity of the 
legislative history of section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment), it is clear from the 
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court that although the states enjoy a 
high degree of control, their authority is subject to certain constitutional limitations. 
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 108 (noting limitations). One of those limitations is the 
Commerce Clause.6 Id. at 108-09. 
The Supreme Court began to sharpen its analysis of the interplay between the 
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor 
Corp., 311 U.S. 324 (1964). In that case, Idlewild Liquor Corp. was "engaged in the 
business of selling bottled wines and liquors to departing international airline travelers 
at the John F. Kennedy Airport in New York." 377 U.S. at 325. Idlewild accepted 
orders from travelers, received payment, and gave the traveler a receipt for the liquor. 
Ibid. Idlewild then transferred the purchased liquor directly to the departing aircraft, 
for delivery to the customer only after the customer had arrived at the foreign 
6
 "The Congress shall have Power * * * [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST, art. I, 
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destination. Ibid. 
The New York State Liquor Authority informed Idlewild that its business was 
illegal under the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, because the business was 
unlicensed and could not be licensed under the law. Id. at 326. Idlewild brought an 
action for an injunction restraining the state from interfering with its operation, which 
had been approved by the United States Bureau of Customs. Id. at 326-27. The 
injunction was granted and the case found its way to the Supreme Court for review. Id. 
at 327-28. 
The issue before the Court was "whether the Twenty-first Amendment so far 
obliterates the Commerce Clause as to empower New York to prohibit absolutely the 
passage of liquor through its territory, under the supervision of the United States 
Bureau of Customs acting under federal law, for delivery to consumers in foreign 
countries." Id. at 329 (footnote omitted). In deciding that question, the Court first 
rejected the notion that state regulation of liquor is immune from the Commerce 
Clause: 
To draw a conclusion from [our previous] decisions that the 
Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to "repeal" the 
Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is 
concerned would * * * be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce 
Clause had been pro tanto "repealed," then Congress would be left with 
no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably 
incorrect. 
§ 8, cl. 3. 
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Id. at 331-32. In short, because "the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce 
Clause are parts of the same Constitution^] * * * each must be considered in the light 
of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete 
case." Ibid. 
The Court then upheld the injunction against New York, concluding that it could 
not constitutionally regulate commerce with foreign nations, where the ultimate delivery 
of the liquor occurred. Id. at 333-34. New York simply could not, consistently with 
the Commerce Clause, "totally * * * prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of 
a law passed by Congress in the exercise of its explicit power under the Constitution to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations." Id. at 334. 
Twenty-two years later in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State 
Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), the Court again found unconstitutional New 
York's attempt to regulate commercial activity involving alcoholic beverages. This 
time, New York had applied its alcoholic-beverage-control laws so as to regulate 
conduct that occurred entirely outside the state. Building on its decision in Hostetter, 
the Court held that New York's extraterritorial regulation of liquor-related commercial 
activity violated the Commerce Clause and was not saved by the Twenty-first 
Amendment. 
The New York law at issue in Brown-Forman prohibited distillers and their 
agents from selling to wholesalers in New York except in accordance with a price 
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schedule filed each month with the State Liquor Authority. 476 U.S. at 575. The law 
also 
requirefd] any distiller or agent that files a schedule of prices to include an 
affirmation that "the bottle and case price of liquor to wholesalers set 
forth in the schedule is no higher than the lowest price at which such item 
of liquor will be sold by such [distiller] to any wholesaler anywhere in 
any other state (or state agency) which owns and operates retail liquor 
stores" during the month covered by the schedule. 
Id. at 576 (brackets in original). 
Brown-Forman Distillers was a distiller that owned several brands of liquor that 
it sold in New York and other states. Ibid. It contended that New York's "affirmation 
law" forced it to discontinue certain promotional-pricing programs (legal in other states 
but not in New York) because such programs prevented it from simultaneously 
complying with the affirmation laws of New York and the other states. That, Brown-
Forman argued, constituted direct regulation of interstate commerce by New York in 
violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 578. 
The Court's analysis "center[ed] on whether New York's affirmation law 
regulate[d] commerce in other States." Id. at 580. If the law had the effect of 
regulating conduct occurring wholly outside the state, then it violated the Commerce 
Clause. Ibid. The Court concluded that New York's law had just that effect and thus 
was unconstitutional: "While New York may regulate the sale of liquor within its 
borders, and may seek low prices for its residents, it may not 'project its legislation 
into [other States] by regulating the price to be paid' for liquor in those States." Id. at 
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582-83 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)) (brackets in 
original). 
The Court rejected New York's contention that the Twenty-first Amendment 
saved the law from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. Noting that "[i]t is well 
settled that the Twenty-first Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of 
alcohol from the reach of the Commerce Clause," the Court viewed its task as being 
the reconciliation of the interests protected by the two constitutional provisions. Id. at 
584-85. It concluded that the Commerce Clause prevailed: 
New York has a valid interest in regulating sales of liquor within 
the territory of New York. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, 
however, speaks only to state regulation of the "transportation or 
importation into any State * * * for delivery or use therein" of alcoholic 
beverages. That Amendment, therefore, gives New York only the 
authority to control sales of liquor in New York, and confers no authority 
to control sales in other States. 
Id. at 585 (emphasis added). See also Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 341-
42 (1989) (rejecting the argument that Connecticut's price-affirmation statute for out-of-
state shippers of beer was authorized by the Twenty-first Amendment regardless of its 
effect on interstate commerce, and holding that under Brown-Forman, the statute 
violated the Commerce Clause because its practical effect was to regulate liquor sales in 
other states). 
As the magistrate recognized in the instant case, the Commerce Clause/Twenty-
first Amendment analysis that the Supreme Court initially formulated in Hostetter and 
then refined in Brown-Forman resolves against the State the issue of whether Utah's 
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extraterritorial application of its liquor laws to regulate BAA's conduct in Illinois is 
permitted by the Commerce Clause. 
3. The State's attempt to enforce Utah's alcoholic-beverage-control laws 
against BAA for lawful commercial conduct occurring wholly outside 
Utah violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-
first Amendment. 
The specific statutes that the State seeks to enforce in this case, although 
technically criminal statutes, are regulatory in nature and, like every other provision in 
Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, apply only to activity in this state. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 32A-1-102(3) (1994) ("The provisions of this title govern alcoholic 
beverage control in this state * * *." (emphasis added)). The issue is whether the State 
may constitutionally apply those statutes to BAA. As was clear from the parties' 
arguments below, resolution of that issue turns on whether the conduct the State seeks 
to regulate occurred entirely outside Utah's borders. In short, did BAA's sales to Utah 
buyers occur in Illinois or in Utah? 
a. Utah may not constitutionally regulate the sale of alcohol in Illinois. 
In the court below, BAA argued that under UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-401(2)(a) 
(1997) and the parallel provision in Illinois' UCC (810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
401(2)(a) (1993))7, its sales of beer to Utah buyers were completed in Illinois, because 
7
 As previously noted, section 70A-2-401(2)(a) provides that "if the contract 
requires or authorizes the seller to send the goods to the buyer but does not require him 
to deliver them at destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of 
shipment^]" Identical language appears in Illinois' code. 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/2-401(2)(a) (1993). Passage of title defines a "sale." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-
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title to the beer passed from BAA to the buyers in Illinois. BAA further argued that the 
buyer was responsible for the shipment of the beer from Illinois into Utah, and thus 
Utah's attempt to regulate BAA's lawful sale of a product in Illinois violated the 
Commerce Clause. 
The State, on the other hand, argued that under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 70A-2-401(2)(b) (1997), title to the beer did not pass to the buyers until delivery in 
Utah, and thus the sales occurred there.8 It further argued that BAA, as the holder of 
title to the beer when it entered Utah, was responsible for shipment of the beer from 
Illinois into Utah, and therefore Utah could prosecute BAA for shipping alcoholic 
beverages into the state. As the magistrate noted, "the State concede[d]: 'If defendants 
had not shipped alcoholic beverages into the State, there would be no crime in Utah.'" 
Orders 7. 
The magistrate rejected the State's position in favor of BAA's. He found as a 
matter of fact and law that BAA's "sales all took place in Illinois, where title passed 
when the prepaid product was delivered to the shipper." Orders 4 (Appellant's Br., 
Addendum B). He expressly found as fact that "[a] 11 purchases are delivered to a 
shipper in Illinois, freight paid, for delivery to the customer in accordance with the 
106(1) (1997) ("A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a 
price (Section 70A-2-401)."). See also 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-106(1) (1993) 
(setting forth identical principle). 
8
 As previously noted, section 70A-2-401(2)(b) provides that "if the contract 
requires delivery at destination, title passes on tender there." 
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customer's instructions." Id. at 3 (emphasis added). He further found that "BAA's 
sole business location is in Illinois" and that "during the period covered by the 
Information (April through December, 1996), BAA sent no employees, representatives 
or agents into [Utah]." Ibid. 
Implicit in the magistrate's findings is that the Utah buyer controlled the 
shipment of beer from Illinois to Utah and that BAA exercised no control over that 
aspect of the transaction. In short, he implicitly found that the shipper was acting as 
the buyer's agent - not as BAA's employee, representative, or agent - when the shipper 
entered Utah with the beer. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994) (in 
the absence of express findings, an appellate court will assume that the trial court found 
facts in accord with its decision whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the 
court actually made such findings). 
The State challenges neither the magistrate's express findings of fact, nor his 
implicit findings, nor the adequacy of the factual findings as a whole to support his 
ultimate finding that all of BAA's sales were completed in Illinois. Absent any such 
challenge, this Court must accept the magistrate's findings of fact, which, in turn, 
dispose of the State's claim that BAA shipped beer into Utah because the sales took 
place in Utah rather than Illinois.9 
As previously noted, the State contends that this Court must presume that the sales 
occurred in Utah, as asserted in the probable cause affidavits supporting the informations. 
As explained in part A(3)(b) of this brief {infra at 33-35), that contention is incorrect. 
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Based on the foregoing findings, the issue before the magistrate was whether 
Utah could constitutionally regulate sales of alcoholic beverages that occurred entirely 
in Illinois. On that issue, the magistrate ruled that three of the charges against BAA 
constituted an unconstitutional extraterritorial application of Utah's alcoholic-beverage-
control laws: 
Utah may not extend its authority to regulate * * * activity that occurs 
entirely outside its borders. In view of this court's ruling that defendants' 
sales take place entirely outside Utah, the court finds that Utah's attempts 
to enforce its Alcohol[ic] Beverage Control legislation, as set forth in 
Counts I, II and III of the Amended Information, is violative of the 
Commerce Clause and not within the authority granted by the Twenty-
first Amendment. 
Orders 9 (Appellant's Br., Addendum B). 
Relying on the analysis of Brown-Forman, the magistrate found the Commerce 
Clause violation obvious: 
The Court finds that the facts of this case may argue more strongly 
than Brown-Forman for invocation of the Commerce Clause prohibition 
on interference with interstate commerce. The New York statute dealt 
specifically and solely with pricing of liquor sold in the state. 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the impact on liquor pricing in other 
states was real. In this case, the law itself does not proclaim an intent to 
regulate sale of liquor in another state, and that probably is not the intent 
of the enforcement agency in bringing these actions, but given this court's 
finding regarding the place of sale, that is the effect, and it is prohibited. 
Accordingly, the court finds that while the underlying statutes are not 
unconstitutional on their face, they are unconstitutional as applied in this 
case, to sales that occurred in Illinois. 
Id. at 9-10. 
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Like the Supreme Court in Brown-Forman, the magistrate concluded that a state 
may not project its laws beyond its borders to regulate commercial activity in another 
state: 
This court cannot accept the notion that the Illinois mail order seller 
should face any greater criminal liability than the Evanston, Wyoming[] 
beer seller or the Napa Valley, California[] wine merchant, who sells to a 
Utah buyer, fully aware that the buyer intends to take his or her purchase 
directly to Utah. If title passes out of state, whether by direct delivery to 
the in-person Utah buyer, or by delivery to the buyer's shipper (under 
long-established principles of commercial law), title has passed, and the 
act of supplying is complete, wholly outside Utah's borders. 
Orders 9 (emphasis in original). 
As noted above, the State's only challenge to the magistrate's Commerce 
Clause/Twenty-first Amendment ruling is that "[t]he magistrate erred by ignoring the 
constitutional concepts of transportation, delivery, and use, choosing instead to focus 
solely on sales." Appellant's Br. 36. But as already discussed, the magistrate's focus 
on the situs-of-sale issue was directly attributable to the State's theory of criminal 
liability and the absence of any indication from the State that he should not focus on 
that issue. 
Furthermore, the State is simply wrong in asserting that "sales" of alcoholic 
beverages cannot be the focus of a court's constitutional analysis where the Twenty-first 
Amendment is involved. There is no support in the United State Supreme Court's case 
law for the State's view that regulation of the "sale" of alcohol does not come under the 
umbrella of the Twenty-first Amendment because "that concept is not mentioned in the 
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Twenty-first Amendment and plays no part in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence." 
Appellant's Br. 36. Brown-Forman directly contradicts that view. As previously 
noted, in that case, the Court held that New York's affirmation law regulated the sale 
of liquor in other states in violation of the Commerce Clause. In so holding, the Court 
specifically said that the law was not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment, which 
"gives New York only the authority to control sales of liquor in New York, and 
confers no authority to control sales in other States." Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 585 
(emphasis added). 
Moreover, both prior to and after Brown-Forman, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the regulation of the "sale" of alcohol is a core Twenty-first Amendment power. 
For example, in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984), the Court 
could not have made the point more clearly: 
In rejecting the claim that the Twenty-first Amendment ousted the 
Federal government of all jurisdiction over interstate traffic in liquor, we 
have held that when a State has not attempted directly to regulate the sale 
or use of liquor within its borders - the core § 2 power - a conflicting 
exercise of federal authority may prevail. 
467 U.S. at 713 (emphasis added). The Court further stated: 
[We] hold that when * * * a state regulation squarely conflicts with the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of federal law, and the 
State's central power under the Twenty-first amendment of regulating the 
times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported and sold 
is not directly implicated, the balance between state and federal power tips 
decisively in favor of federal law, and enforcement of the state statute is 
barred by the Supremacy Clause. 
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Id. at 716 (emphasis added). See also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 346 
(1987) (reaffirming that the Twenty-first Amendment grants a state virtually complete 
control over importation or sale of liquor within its borders). 
To summarize, the Supreme Court's holding in Brown-Forman made it clear that 
although the Twenty-first Amendment gives a state broad authority to regulate liquor 
within its own borders, it does not permit a state to project its liquor laws beyond its 
borders and regulate commercial activity involving liquor in other states. It does not 
matter whether that activity involves "sales" or some other activity. Thus, under the 
Brown-Forman line of cases, Utah may not project its laws beyond its borders to 
regulate a transaction that occurs entirely in Illinois. 
As the magistrate correctly observed, permitting the State to prosecute BAA in 
this case would lead to the conclusion that Utah is free to enforce its alcoholic-
beverage-control laws against the California winery, the Wyoming convenience store, 
and the Oregon microbrewery that lawfully sell alcoholic-beverage products to a 
visiting Utah resident who they know or reasonably believe will return to Utah with 
those products. Such a conclusion would fly in the face of Brown-Forman and the 
numerous other Supreme Court decisions holding that a state may not enforce its liquor 
laws to regulate conduct occurring wholly outside its borders. 
Moreover, if BAA is subject to prosecution under the facts of this case, one 
could not avoid the conclusion that those lawfully engaged in the sale of liquor in any 
state would have to ensure that they were not selling to a non-resident who is prohibited 
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by his or her home-state liquor laws from returning with liquor purchased in another 
state. That is just the sort of extraterritorial regulation the Supreme Court repeatedly 
has condemned as violative of the Commerce Clause and outside a state's authority 
under the Twenty-first Amendment. 
The State simply has failed to show that the application of Utah law in this case 
either survives the force of the Commerce Clause or is saved by the Twenty-first 
Amendment.10 The magistrate correctly applied the analysis of Brown-Forman to the 
facts of this case. Because the State's attempt to regulate commercial conduct 
occurring wholly outside Utah violates the Commerce Clause under Brown-Forman, 
this Court should affirm the dismissal of the charges against BAA. The Constitution 
simply does not permit the State of Utah to trundle out the great machinery of 
government and interfere with lawful commercial activity in another state.11 
0
 In its discussion of the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment issue, the 
State asserts that its "concern for mail-order liquor sales is legitimate, inasmuch as such 
sales raise serious concerns for underage drinking." Appellant's Br. 32 & n. 12. In 
support of that assertion, the State cites a number of newspaper articles, reports, and 
studies on the extent of underage drinking. Ibid. Although controlling underage 
drinking certainly is a legitimate goal of state regulation under the Twenty-first 
Amendment, none of the authorities the State cites purports to link mail-order liquor 
sales to the problem of underage drinking. Furthermore, the State never presented any 
of those authorities to the magistrate; nor did it argue to him that the State's legitimate 
concern about underage drinking had any bearing on the Commerce Clause/Twenty-
first Amendment analysis. Accordingly, this Court should not consider the State's 
discussion of underage drinking. 
11
 A Florida court recently reached a similar conclusion in dismissing an action 
brought by the State of Florida against several out-of-state mail-order sellers of alcoholic-
beverage products for allegedly selling and delivering those products to Florida 
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In summary, the State's decision to file criminal charges against BAA flies in the 
face of the history surrounding repeal of the eighteenth Amendment, the plain language 
of section 2 of the twenty-first amendment, and the long line of Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting section 2. 
As pointed out in this brief, repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment evidences the 
failure of Prohibition in this country. Thus, adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment 
and section 2 expresses the reality that there was no national consensus concerning 
alcoholic-beverage traffic. Accordingly, Congress delegated to the states the power to 
establish alcohol policy within the jurisdiction of each state. The authority cited in this 
brief documents the jurisdictional limitation of a state's policy. Where a state has 
attempted to impose its will on activities beyond its borders, such an attempt has for the 
most part failed in light of the Commerce Clause. 
Utah residents and others travel and enjoy the experience of purchasing 
consumer products. Moreover, it is common knowledge that Utah resdients and 
tourists from other states have, for a long period of time, elected to purchase alcoholic 
products out-of-state and bring them into Utah. That activity has proliferated over the 
years without resistance from the State. It is for these reasons that the State's action in 
this case is particularly troublesome. 
customers in violation of state law. State v. Sam's Wines & Liquors, No. 963602 (Sept. 
3, 1997), appeal pending, No. 97-03828 (Fla. 1st DCA). 
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b. This Court is not required to presume as true the State's allegation 
that BAA's sales of beer to Utah buyers occurred in Utah and not in 
Illinois. 
The foregoing analysis rests on the magistrate's finding that BAA's sales of beer 
to Utah buyers occurred in Illinois, not in Utah. Although the State does not expressly 
argue the point in the section of its brief addressing the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first 
Amendment issue, an implied basis for its position on that issue may be its contention -
made in another section of its brief (the part addressing the magistrate's application of 
the UCC) - that BAA's sales occurred in Utah, not in Illinois. The State contends that 
the magistrate, in considering BAA's motions to dismiss, was required to presume as 
true the State's assertion that "[BAA's] contract requires * * * that beer be delivered to 
the customer's house [in Utah]," and that "consequently, even under the UCC, 'title 
passe[d] on tender there.'" Appellant's Br. 16 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-
401(2)(b) (1997)). The State further asserts that on review this Court must make the 
same presumption. See Appellant's Br. 2 (stating that in reviewing this case, this Court 
"will 'accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs'" - quoting Hebertson 
v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted)). 
The problem with the State's argument is that it grafts principles of civil 
procedure onto a criminal case where specific rules of criminal procedure apply. The 
State cites only civil cases decided under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
in support of its position. See Appellant's Br. 2, 16 (citing Hebertson, 923 P.2d at 
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1390, and Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)). Those 
cases are inapposite, because the magistrate proceeded under Rules 12 and 25, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, in dismissing the charges against BAA. Orders 1-2 
(noting that BAA's motions were filed pursuant to those rules) (Appellant's Br., 
Addendum B). As explained below, those rules permitted the magistrate to make 
necessary factual findings in resolving the issues presented by BAA's motions to 
dismiss. 
The State makes no claim that the magistrate improperly proceeded under Rules 
12 and 25. Rule 25 permits a court to dismiss the charges against a defendant without 
trial "[i]n its discretion, for substantial cause," and requires dismissal if "[t]he court is 
without jurisdiction." Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a) & (b)(4). Nothing in that rule prohibits 
the court from making findings of fact necessary for the order of dismissal. Rule 12, 
which provides that "application to the court for an order shall be by motion," 
expressly contemplates factual findings by a court in its determination of a motion: 
"Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record." Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c). 
Thus, the rules of criminal procedure applicable to this case permit a court to 
make necessary findings of fact in deciding a motion to dismiss. Contrary to the State's 
view, the magistrate was free to make findings of fact in deciding BAA's motions to 
dismiss, and he was not required to presume as true the prosecutor's proffer concerning 
the terms of the contract between BAA and its Utah customers. That is particularly 
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true when the motion to dismiss involves the constitutionality of a prosecution like that 
here, which squarely presents the issue of whether the application of Utah's alcoholic-
beverage-control laws violates the Commerce Clause. In this case, resolution of that 
legal issue required the magistrate to make a factual determination of where BAA's 
sales of beer occurred - inside or outside Utah. 
Accordingly, as this Court does with other trial court decisions on Rule 12 
motions, the findings of fact underlying the magistrate's decision on BAA's motions to 
dismiss are reviewed under the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 
See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (trial court's findings of 
fact underlying motion to suppress are reviewed under "clearly erroneous" standard); 
State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App. 1993) (factual findings underlying denial 
of motion to dismiss based on entrapment reviewed for clear error). A reviewing court 
will find clear error only if the factual findings are not supported by the record, 
resolving all disputes in the evidence in the light most favorable to the lower court's 
determination. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Because the State does not contend that the magistrate's findings are clearly 
erroneous, let alone make a showing that they are, this Court must accept those findings 
on review. 
4. Summary 
The foregoing demonstrates that the magistrate correctly dismissed the charges 
against BAA as violative of the Commerce Clause. That disposes of the State's appeal. 
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This Court need not go on to address the State's challenge to the magistrate's 
alternative ground for dismissal - that the court lacked jurisdiction under both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction criteria - because, even assuming the magistrate erred in that 
regard, the Commerce Clause bars this prosecution. 
If, however, the Court is inclined to consider the State's arguments concerning 
the ruling on jurisdiction, BAA addresses them below. 
B. The magistrate correctly concluded that Utah lacks jurisdiction to enforce its 
alcoholic-beverage-control laws against BAA for conduct occurring outside 
the state. 
The State contends that the magistrate's alternative basis for dismissal - lack of 
jurisdiction - also is incorrect. It argues that in concluding there was no jurisdiction, 
the magistrate erroneously applied a civil "minimum contacts" analysis and further 
erred in determining that even under Utah's criminal jurisdiction statute, there was no 
jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the magistrate's ruling on jurisdiction should 
be upheld. 
1. Introduction 
Although the "minimum contacts" issue raised by the State is not as easily 
resolved as it would have this Court believe - particularly where, as in this case, a 
corporation is named as the defendant in a criminal proceeding12 - this Court need not 
See David James Homsey, Comment, CriminalJurisdiction Over Foreign 
Corporations: The Application of a Minimum Contacts Theory, 17 San Diego L. Rev. 
429 (1980) (arguing that a "minimum contacts" analysis is appropriate where a state 
attempts to assert criminal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation). 
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decide that issue to dispose of the State's challenge to the ruling on jurisdiction. 
Because the State cannot prevail under the criminal jurisdiction statute it contends 
governs this case, the Court can dispose of the State's assignment of error on that 
ground alone. 
In examining the limited issue concerning the criminal jurisdiction statute, it is 
important at the outset to discuss just what the magistrate was deciding when he ruled 
that the court lacked jurisdiction. Given the magistrate's finding that BAA's sales 
occurred in Illinois, the narrow jurisdictional question presented to him was whether the 
criminal jurisdiction statute permitted Utah to apply its criminal laws to BAA based on 
conduct that occurred entirely outside Utah. He concluded that it did not: 
In view of the court's ruling that the sale[s] occurred - and [were] 
completed - in Illinois, the State's own language ends the inquiry. At 
page 11 of its memorandum, the State concedes: "If defendants had not 
shipped alcoholic beverages into the State, there would be no crime in 
Utah." 
Orders 7. The validity of that conclusion is the issue before this Court. 
1. The criminal jurisdiction statute 
The State maintains that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (Supp. 1998) governs the 
jurisdictional question presented here. That statute provides in part: 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense 
which he commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own 
conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the 
state[.] 
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* * * * 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the 
conduct which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such 
an element, occurs within the state. 
* * # * 
(5) The judge shall determine jurisdiction. 
The State contends that based on section 76-l-201(l)(a) and (2), BAA is subject 
to prosecution in Utah because its "conduct [in Illinois] caused an unlawful result 
within this state," and thus BAA committed the charged offenses partly within Utah. 
Appellant's Br. 29-30. The State relies solely on the "result" test set forth in section 
76-1-201(2), making no claim that BAA committed any act in Utah that would subject it 
to prosecution under the alternative test contained in that provision -i.e., "conduct 
which is any element of the offense * * * occurs within the state." 
The State's "result" argument is different from the one it articulated with clarity 
to the magistrate, which was that BAA had shipped beer into Utah in violation of Utah. 
That is, BAA had committed a criminal act within Utah, and that act subjected it to 
prosecution here. Although the prosecutor made a passing reference to the "result" 
theory the State now presses on appeal, he did not meaningfully develop that theory -
certainly not to the degree the State has in this Court. (R. 757). Accordingly, this 
Court should decline to consider the State's argument on appeal and affirm the 
magistrate's ruling on jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. McGrath, 928 P.2d 1033, 1039 
n. 2 (Utah App. 1996) (nominal reference to state constitution was insufficient to lay 
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groundwork for "thoughtful and probing analysis" of issue in trial court); State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993) ("The trial court is considered the proper 
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of issues."). 
In any event, the magistrate's dismissal of the charges for lack of jurisdiction 
should be affirmed for the following additional reasons. 
2. Count III 
In Count III, BAA was charged with unlawful warehousing, distribution, and 
transportation of alcoholic beverages in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-9-101(2) 
(1994), which provides in part: 
A person may not warehouse, distribute, or transport liquor for 
resale to wholesale or retail customers unless the person is issued a 
warehousing license by the commission. A separate license is required 
for each warehousing facility. 
The State contends that "[t]he charged facts establish that, as a result of defendants' 
actions in Illinois, alcohol was distributed or transported for sale or resale to retail 
customers within this state without a license." Appellant's Br. 31. 
In making that argument, the State fails to take into account the precise wording 
of section 76-1-201(2) and the distinction between "result" and "conduct" in the 
criminal law. In their treatise on criminal law, Professors LaFave and Scott explain 
how crimes traditionally are defined and how the definitions sometimes require that 
conduct produce certain results: 
The various crimes (whether they are statutory crimes or common 
law crimes) are of course variously defined as to what actions and states 
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of mind are required for guilt. Here we may note that the definitions also 
* * * sometimes require that the necessary conduct produce certain 
results. * * * Some crimes are so worded that a bad result is needed for 
commission of the crime. For instance, criminal homicide requires the 
death of a human being, battery the injury of such a person, arson the 
burning of property, malicious mischief the injury or destruction of 
property, false pretenses the loss of title to property or money. 
Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., 1 Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(c), p. 11 
(1986) (emphasis in original). In short, "conduct" and "result" are distinct concepts. 
A "result" is the product of "conduct." 
Under section 76-l-201(l)(a) and (2), a person is subject to prosecution in Utah 
if the person's conduct produces a result within the state, even though the conduct 
occurred outside the state. The "result," however, must be an element of the charged 
offense. § 76-1-201(2). Therefore, one must look to the definition of a particular 
offense to determine whether a "result" is actually an element of that offense. 
Turning to the charge in Count III, the terms "distribute" and "transport," as 
used in section 32A-9-101(2), are not "results"; rather, they are "conduct." Put 
another way, the statute does not set out distribution and transportation of liquor as a 
prohibited result; rather, it prohibits the act of distributing or transporting . Thus, to 
be guilty of a violation of section 32A-9-101(2), a person must have personally 
distributed or transported liquor in Utah. Although a person's conduct outside Utah 
theoretically could result in the distribution or transportation of liquor in Utah by 
someone else, that result is not an element of the offense defined in section 32A-9-
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101(2). Indeed, that provision contains only prohibited conduct; it does not include any 
prohibited result. 
In short, the "result" the State identifies for Count III is not an element of the 
offense defined in section 32A-9-101(2). The State's theory of jurisdiction therefore 
fails the "result" test set forth in section 76-1-201(2), which limits Utah's jurisdiction to 
cases where the "result" upon which the State bases its prosecution "occurs within the 
state" and "is * * * an element [of the charged offense]." (Emphasis added.) 
Jurisdiction does not lie under section 76-1-201(2) simply because the State can point to 
an undesirable result in Utah from conduct outside the state. 
Looking at the question in a slightly different way, it is clear from the plain 
language of section 32A-9-101 that the statute applies only to a person who engages in 
warehousing, distributing, or transporting liquor within the State of Utah. That is so 
because section 32A-9-101 must be read in light of UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-1-102(3) 
(1994), which states: "The provisions of this title govern alcoholic beverage control in 
this state * * *." (Emphasis added.) Further, the customers of the "person" referred 
to in section 32A-9-101(2) are "wholesale or retail customers" who receive liquor on a 
"resale" basis. In short, the customers are wholesalers or retailers. 
The State's charging documents (including the probable cause affidavits) do not 
allege any facts that would support a finding that BAA engaged in warehousing, 
distributing, or transporting liquor within Utah for resale to a wholesaler or retailer. 
Thus, BAA's conduct - as alleged by the State - is not covered by the plain language of 
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section 32A-9-101(2). That fact, coupled with the fact that the "result" test of section 
76-1-201(2) is not satisfied, gives this Court ample grounds for affirming the 
magistrate's dismissal of Count III. See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 
1995) ("It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm a lower court's ruling on 
any proper grounds, even though the lower court relied on some other ground."). 
3. Count II 
The magistrate's dismissal of Count II for lack of jurisdiction was correct for the 
same reasons that pertain to Count III. In Count II, BAA was charged with unlawful 
sale or supply of alcohol in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-201 (1994), which 
provides in part: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person * * * to keep for sale, * * * sell, 
offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply to another, any alcoholic 
beverage or product, except as provided by this title or the rules of the 
commission adopted under this title. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided, a manufacturer, supplier, or 
importer of liquor, wine, and heavy beer products * * * may not sell * * * 
or otherwise furnish or supply these products to another within this state 
other than the department and military installations. 
The State contends that "[t]he charged facts establish that, as a result of defendants' 
actions in Illinois, liquor was furnished or supplied to persons within this state other 
than the DABC and military installations." Appellant's Br. 30. 
As is the case with respect to distribution and transportation of liquor under 
section 32A-9-101(2) (the statutory basis for the charge in Count III), the furnishing or 
supplying of liquor that is prohibited by section 32A-12-201 is "conduct" not a 
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"result." Section 32A-12-201, like section 32A-9-101(2), contains only prohibited 
conduct; it targets no prohibited result. The "result" identified by the State simply is 
not an element of the offense defined by section 32A-12-201. Consequently, the State's 
"result" theory of jurisdiction fails for Count II for the same reason that it fails for 
Count III. 
Moreover, like section 32A-9-101(2), section 32A-12-201 applies only to 
conduct that occurs in Utah. The State therefore may not prosecute a person under that 
statute for conduct that occurred entirely outside the state. It has attempted to do just 
that in this case. The magistrate correctly prohibited the State from doing so by 
dismissing Count II. 
4. Count I 
Finally, the State's similar argument with respect to Count I also should be 
rejected. In that count, the State charged BAA with unlawful importation of alcohol in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-503 (1994), which states: 
It is unlawful for any * * * person[] to ship or transport or cause to be 
shipped or transported into this state * * * any alcoholic product, or to * * 
* furnish any alcoholic product to any person within this state, when the 
alcoholic product is intended by any interested person to be received, 
possessed, sold, or in any manner used * * * in violation of the laws of 
this state. 
The State argues that "[t]he alleged facts establish that, as a result of defendants' 
actions in Illinois, liquor was shipped or transported into Utah or furnished to persons 
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within this state who intended to possess or use it in any manner that violates state 
laws." Appellant's Br. 30. 
Insofar as the State relies on the "furnish[ing] any alcoholic product" element of 
the offense defined in section 32A-12-503, that element is "conduct," not a "result," 
and therefore cannot provide the basis for jurisdiction under the State's "result" theory. 
Furthermore, under the plain language of the statute, read in light of section 32A-1-
102(3)'s proviso that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act regulates alcoholic beverages 
only within Utah, a person must have done the "furnishing" within the state to be guilty 
of violating the statute. Because the State does not contend that BAA did any act within 
Utah that constitutes "furnishing," there is no basis for criminal liability. 
On the other hand, if the State is arguing that jurisdiction lies because BAA's 
conduct in Illinois "caused" alcoholic beverages to be shipped or transported into Utah 
and thus BAA's extraterritorial conduct created a "result" in Utah that subjects it to 
jurisdiction under section 76-1-201(2), that argument arguably finds support in the 
following language of section 32A-12-503: "It is unlawful for any * * * person to * * 
* cause to be shipped or transported into this state * * * any alcoholic product * * * in 
violation of the laws of this state." (Emphasis added.) That language appears to define 
a prohibited result, unlike the language of sections 32A-9-101(2) and 32A-12-201. 
The State, however, ultimately is no better off with respect to Count I than it is 
on the other counts. As discussed in part A of this brief, the State's theory before the 
magistrate was that BAA had shipped beer into Utah. In arguing that theory, the State 
44 
took the position that location of BAA's sale of beer was a critical threshold question, 
making it clear to the magistrate that the State believed BAA's criminal liability for 
illegal shipment depended on a determination that title to the beer passed from BAA to 
the buyer in Utah and thus that the sale occurred in Utah rather than Illinois. 
As already noted, although the prosecutor made vague references to the concept 
of criminal liability based on a defendant's extraterritorial conduct causing an unlawful 
result in Utah, he never articulated a precise theory of BAA's liability based on that 
concept. (R. 757). Indeed, the State argued only a conduct-within-the-state theory: 
"The elements of the crimes charged against the defendants in this action involve the 
delivery of alcoholic beverages into Utah (directly, or through agents). * * * If the 
deliveries, furnishing, or transportation occurs in Utah, the State has jurisdiction * * 
*." Pltf.'s Mem. 11 (R. 71:347). 
The State may respond that such precision concerning its "result" theory was not 
required in presenting its the case to the magistrate. But both the Commerce Clause 
issue and the jurisdictional issue demanded a clear articulation of the State's theory. In 
pursuing its unprecedented criminal prosecution against BAA for commercial activity 
conducted wholly and lawfully in Illinois, such imprecision in presenting its case to the 
magistrate is inexcusable. 
In sum, the State's theory that BAA's out-of-state conduct caused the shipment 
or transportation of liquor into Utah is unpreserved and therefore should not be 
considered by this Court. The absence of any meaningful development of that theory 
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deprived BAA of the opportunity to respond and denied the magistrate the opportunity 
to consider the issue. As this Court has said in explaining the reasons for declining to 
consider unpreserved arguments: 
The trial court is considered the proper forum in which to commence 
thoughtful and probing analysis of issues. Failing to argue an issue * * * 
in that forum denies the trial court the opportunity to make any findings of 
fact or conclusions of law pertinent to the claimed error. * * * Therefore, 
to ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider an issue, appellate 
review of criminal cases in Utah requires * * * some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error * * *. 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993). 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the magistrate's dismissal of Count I.13 
C. The State is not without a remedy in cases like this one; the Utah buyers and 
their agents, the shippers, are subject to prosecution under existing law. 
The State may complain that affirming the dismissal of the charges in this case 
leaves it without a remedy for a perceived violation of Utah's alcoholic-beverage-
control laws. The simple answer is that under current law, the State can file criminal 
charges against the Utah buyer and the buyer's agent, the shipper. 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-212 (1994), a person may not "have or 
possess within this state any liquor unless authorized by this title or the rules of the 
commission." Thus, a Utah resident is prohibited from importing any alcoholic 
13
 As the State concedes, Count V, which charged a pattern of unlawful activity 
under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1601 et 
seq. (1995), stands or falls with Counts I, II, and III. Appellant's Br. 31. Therefore, 
the magistrate also correctly dismissed Count V. 
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beverages into the state unless authorized by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 
Section 32A-12-212(l)(a) restricts such importation to "one liter of liquor purchased 
from without the United States" that is "possessed] for personal consumption and not 
for sale or resale." Therefore, a person in Utah who ships beer purchased from BAA 
into the state has violated that provision. The State, however, chose not to charge its 
own residents in this case. 
Similarly, the shipper, if it acted with the requisite culpable mental state, is 
subject to prosecution under section 32A-12-503 (the basis for the charge in Count I), 
for transporting beer into Utah in violation of state law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
102 (1995) (requiring proof of culpable mental state for all offenses not involving strict 
liability). The State, however, chose not to charge the shipper. 
In sum, the State filed against the wrong parties in this case. For whatever 
reasons, it elected not to pursue available remedies against the Utah buyers and the 
shipper. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the dismissal of the 
charges against BAA. 
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